tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-36597619.post514700229006329953..comments2014-11-19T16:34:05.844-05:00Comments on bleb: On the Semantic Indecision of Vague Singular TermsDan López de Sahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16716694655307652854noreply@blogger.comBlogger4125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-36597619.post-22830805394198609932007-08-23T14:20:00.000-04:002007-08-23T14:20:00.000-04:00Actually, I find this quite interesting, and I am ...Actually, I find this quite interesting, and I am not sure about what to say: many thanks for raising the issue!<BR/><BR/>It is (super-)true that whatever is a person is indeed a person, and thus arguably necessarily if something is a person then it is a person. But I guess essentialism, in the relevant sense, would count as vindicated only if the following turns out to be (super-)true:<BR/><BR/>If something is a person then necessarily this thing is a person.<BR/><BR/>Take an arbitrary precisification and let <I>x</I> be something that counts as a person according to it. What is it for <I>x</I> to count, wrt to that precisification, as such that necessarily it is a person? I’ll have to revisit the literature on how the space of precisifications and that of possible worlds should interact. Interesting!Dan López de Sahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16716694655307652854noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-36597619.post-19292046927702434422007-08-22T02:36:00.000-04:002007-08-22T02:36:00.000-04:00Thanks for the links.I think my line of reasoning ...Thanks for the links.<BR/><BR/>I think my line of reasoning was that since there are precisisifications of 'person' according to which candidate x isn't a person, then x isn't essentially a person. On the other hand, if I have the view right, x never fails to be a person on that particular precisification that counts x as a person. So if we think of this particular precisification as 'person*', then x is essentially a person*.<BR/><BR/>I'm sure you know this terrain better than I, so feel free to impart some wisdom.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-36597619.post-18305363771694505342007-08-21T11:39:00.000-04:002007-08-21T11:39:00.000-04:00Hi ChrisB!Even if only one out of all the candidat...Hi ChrisB!<BR/><BR/><I>Even if only one out of all the candidates is a 'person', aren't there still multiple thinking beings present. I take it that Smith would still find this troubling.</I><BR/><BR/>Well, I imagine that the defender of the so-called "supervaluationist" solution could try the same trick with 'thinking', 'conscious', etc. than with 'person'. But I agree with the underlying thought: reflecting on the fact that the many candidates do share the features that are ultimately relevant for something to be of the given kind (plus the fact that there are paradigmatic cases of that kind) may eventually give rise to an argument why the defender of the view of vagueness as semantic indecision <I>should not</I> at the end of the day hold the so-called "supervaluationist solution" to the problem of the many. (I myself think there is such an argument forthcoming, see <A HREF="http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/~dlds/Lewis.pdf" REL="nofollow">this paper</A>, and also <A HREF="http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9264.2006.00206.x?journalCode=paso" REL="nofollow">Williams 2006</A> for a different argument for the same conclusion.)<BR/><BR/><I>Also, this solution appears to have the consequence that persons are not essentially persons, which may be ok.</I><BR/><BR/>I also think that it might be ok that persons are not essentially persons. But I didn't quite see how this would be a consequence of the view. I guess it will depend of how 'determinately' and 'necessarily' interact, did you have some particular view in mind?Dan López de Sahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16716694655307652854noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-36597619.post-79053677612824666452007-08-20T15:16:00.000-04:002007-08-20T15:16:00.000-04:00Dan, Even if only one out of all the candidates is...Dan, <BR/><BR/>Even if only one out of all the candidates is a 'person', aren't there still multiple thinking beings present. I take it that Smith would still find this troubling. Also, this solution appears to have the consequence that persons are not essentially persons, which may be ok.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com