tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-365976192024-03-07T09:02:20.176-05:00blebReal matters issuing from words, issues where words don't really matter, et ceteraDan López de Sahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16716694655307652854noreply@blogger.comBlogger45125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-36597619.post-10422326026488601382009-10-23T13:45:00.005-04:002009-10-23T14:09:21.385-04:00On 'Content Relativism'At the <a href="http://www.institutnicod.org/act.php?n=185&cat=&lang=en&year=2010#">II Jean Nicod-LOGOS Workshop</a> I was talking about the phenomenon of audience-sensitivity recently discussed by Egan (<a href="http://www.springerlink.com/content/u7q1v2723w14348k/">2009</a>).<br /> <br />Some (not Egan himself) have suggested that such a phenomenon motivates a form of “assessment-sensitivity” of type B1 <a href="http://blebblog.blogspot.com/2009/10/relativisms-relativisms.html">in previous post</a>. My first aim in the talk was to illustrate how this is not so. Egan suggested that the phenomenon however may motivate at least a refinement the contention that features of one single context determine the truth-value of the sentence. The second aim of the talk was to explore how this may not be so (basically exploiting the flexibility of Lewisian contexts as particular locations where a sentence could be said.)<br /> <br />What interests me here is how to call the assessment-sensitive position alluded to above. In MacFarlane (<a href="http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/120092542/abstract?CRETRY=1&SRETRY=0">2005</a>) he called it ‘expressive relativism.’ More recently, he has adopted ‘content relativism’. Although I followed him in López de Sa (<a href="http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/%7Edlds/ManyRels.pdf">2010</a>) (and indeed the talk in Paris), there seem to be two sources of possible dissatisfaction with the choice.<br /> <br />First, MacFarlane picks it from Egan & Hawthrone & Weatherson (<a href="http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=kwlIyyeS8zoC&oi=fnd&pg=PA131&dq=epistemic+modals+in+context&ots=wQvDrHCmar&sig=hZEBrxZb6azMBL3q3KV45Xgq0TA#v=onepage&q=epistemic%20modals%20in%20context&f=false">2005</a>), and it is not completely clear to me the view intended there. Actually, in the paper I was discussing Egan seems to use the expression for the non-assessment-sensitive position involving different contents or "propositions" for the different people in the audience, see p. 207. <br /><br />Second, Cappelen (<a href="http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=pvUsQ0sLjdEC&oi=fnd&pg=RA1-PA265&dq=%22content+relativism%22&ots=iE9WSclM4A&sig=kTP8UobNZuBzAjztAasmLaXBZHs#v=onepage&q=%22content%20relativism%22&f=false">2008</a>) calls ‘content relativism’ a view according to which the content or “proposition” assigned to a sentence at a context (of utterance) varies between contexts of interpretation, where “a <span style="font-style: italic;">context of interpretation</span> is just what you would think it is: a context from which an utterance is interpreted” (fn. 7). It is not clear to me that the “interpretation” alluded to here is the mechanism involved in the presence of audience-sensitive expression or that involving assessment-sensitivity proper.<br /><br /> So what to do? One alternative would be to stick to the original ‘expressive relativism’, but not even MacFarlane seems to be doing that. Another would be to adopt Weatherson’s ‘indexical relativism.’ This has the virtue of following a systematic naming scheme, but would have the inconvenient that the label has been used to refer to indexical contextualist positions, see for instance Wright (<a href="http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/110/437/45">2001</a>).<br /><br />Any views?Dan López de Sahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16716694655307652854noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-36597619.post-3492435264933360982009-10-23T06:31:00.005-04:002009-10-23T07:01:51.881-04:00Relativisms & 'Relativism'sI’m Paris, after a very enjoyable <a href="http://www.institutnicod.org/act.php?n=185&cat=&lang=en&year=2010#">II Jean Nicod-LOGOS Workshop</a>. During many of the sessions, I was confirming the impression I got that there seems to be something like an emerging consensus regarding the taxonomy of positions in recent debates about contextualism and relativism.<br /><blockquote>A: Views according to which there is variation of truth-value, but it is always <span style="font-style: italic;">contextual</span>: sentence s can be true at context c while false at context c*.</blockquote><blockquote>B: Views about which some variation of truth-value is not contextual but <span style="font-style: italic;">perspectival</span>: sentence s at context (of use) c can be true when assessed from perspective (or context of assessment) p while false when assessed from perspective p*.</blockquote>Notice that this main distinction does not involve the notion of the content or “proposition” of a sentence, and is thus available to those sympathetic to Lewis (<a href="http://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&q=Index+context+and+content+lewis&btnG=Search&as_ylo=&as_vis=0">1980</a>)’s misgivings.<br /><br />Once such a notion is introduced, however, two further distinctions become available. Among A-views,<br /><blockquote>A1: Sentence s can be true at context c while false at c* by the content of s at c being different than the content of s at c*;</blockquote><blockquote><blockquote></blockquote>A2: Sentence s can be true at context c while false at context c* even if the content of s is the same at c and at c* by this content determining a different value with respect to the relevant different features of c and c* (or “circumstances of evaluation” determined by c and c*).</blockquote>Among B-views, the corresponding:<br /><blockquote>B1: Sentence s at context c can be true when assessed from p while false when assessed from p* by the content of s at c wrt p being different than the content of s at c wrt p*;<br /></blockquote><blockquote>B2: Sentence s at context c can be true when assessed from p while false when assessed from p* even if the content of s at c is the same wrt p and p* by this content determining a different value with respect to the relevant different features of (c and) p and (c and p*) (or “circumstances of evaluation” determined by (c and) p and (c and) p*).<br /></blockquote>The consensus alluded to concerns the <span style="font-style: italic;">taxons</span> themselves, not the labels to refer to them. I thought it’d be convenient to have a map of the alternatives, if only to facilitate communication ;-). So here are some options:<br /><br />MacFarlane (<a href="http://www.springerlink.com/content/e072383726380533/">2007</a>, <span style="font-style: italic;">inter alia</span>):<br />A = Contextualism<br /><blockquote>A1 = Indexical Contextualism<br /> A2 = Non-Indexical Contextualism<br /></blockquote>B = Relativism<br /> <blockquote>B1 = Content Relativism<br /> B2 = Truth Relativism</blockquote>Weatherson (<a href="http://www.springerlink.com/content/45785071q1088085/">2009</a>, <span style="font-style: italic;">inter alia</span>):<br />A = Contextualism<br /> <blockquote>A1= Indexical Contextualism<br /> A2 = Non-Indexical Contextualism</blockquote>B = Relativism<br /> <blockquote>B1= Indexical Relativism<br /> B2 = Non-Indexical Relativism<br /></blockquote>López de Sa (<a href="http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/%7Edlds/ManyRels.pdf">2010</a>, <span style="font-style: italic;">inter alia</span>):<br />A = Moderate Relativism (=Contextualism)<br /> <blockquote>A1= Indexical Contextualism<br /> A2 = Non-Indexical Contextualism<br /></blockquote>B = Radical Relativism<blockquote>B1 = Content (Radical) Relativism<br /> B2 = Truth (Radical) Relativism</blockquote>At the workshop, other groupings of A1, A2, B1, B2 were mentioned. If I don’t misunderstand them:<br /><br />Kölbel (<a href="http://www.springerlink.com/content/nl5t765840247115/">2009</a>, <span style="font-style: italic;">inter alia</span>):<br />A1 = (Indexical) Contextualism<br />A2 & B2 = Relativism<br /> <blockquote>A2 = Moderate Relativism<br /> B2 = Radical Relativism</blockquote>(Adopted at the workshop by Marques and Zeman. I attributed it to Ripley, but he actually speaks like Weatherson. As he stressed to me, Weatherson-talk has as a virtue that it allows easy reference to the pairs A1&B1 and A2&B2 as the Indexical views and the Non-Indexical views.)<br /><br />Remark: The forms of assessment-sensitivity in B1 would not count as Relativism (nor <span style="font-style: italic;">a fortiori</span> Radical Relativism).<br /><br />Recanati:<br />A1 = Contextualism<br />A2 & B1 & B2 = Relativism<br /> <blockquote>A2 = Moderate Relativism<br /> B1 & B2 = Radical Relativism<br /><ul><li> B1 = Content Relativism</li><li> B2 = Truth Relativism</li></ul></blockquote>Question: Which (natural enough) feature do A2 & B1 & B2 share vs A1?<br /><br />Anyway, do people know of still other usages of the expressions, at least by people accepting something like the A1, A2, B1, B2 partition?Dan López de Sahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16716694655307652854noreply@blogger.com4tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-36597619.post-16196452310776303232009-05-18T10:14:00.009-04:002009-05-18T12:34:50.260-04:00Disjunctions, Conjunctions, and their Truthmakers, II<a href="http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/118/470/417" target="_blank">My discussion</a> of <a href="http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/115/460/957" target="_blank">Rodriguez-Pereyra 2006</a> is finally out in <i>Mind</i>, yay!!<br /><br />Following it, <a href="http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/118/470/427" target="_blank">Gonzalo’s response</a>:<br /><br /><blockquote style="border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204); margin: 0pt 0pt 0pt 0.8ex; padding-left: 1ex;" class="gmail_quote"> López de Sa has objected both to my defence of the Disjunction Thesis and my case against the Conjunction Thesis. I shall show that his objections are unfounded and based on serious misunderstandings of my position, what the relevant debate is, and some fundamental notions of Truthmaker Theory.<br /></blockquote><br />Ouch.<br /><br />Rhetoric aside, however, I did not really find in the piece replies to my objections.<br /><br />A. My main objection against the the contention that if something is a truthmaker for a disjunctive truth, then it is a truthmaker for one of its disjuncts is simply that assuming some plausible but controversial views (on, say, vagueness, or open futures), there can be disjunctions that are (made) true, without true disjuncts. Gonzalo seems to concede the case against the principle, but then contends that the principle he was interested in was the restriction to "truth-conditional disjunctions". As I discussed in my paper (p. 420), it is not clear how to understand talk about a given disjunction being truth-functional in the present context. In any case, I considered one candidate such restriction (fn. 8):<br /><blockquote>(∨–) If T is a truthmaker for the truth that<i> p</i> or<i> q</i>, then—<i>provided it is true that p or it is true that q</i>—either T is a truthmaker for the truth that <i>p</i> or T is a truthmaker for the truth that <i>q</i>.<br /></blockquote>This seems capable of sustaining the relevant step in the trivializing argument (see my fn. 3) but, I contended, inherits the concerns one may have with respect to the unrestricted principle: in a nutshell, if something can be a truthmaker for a disjunctive truth and still fail to make true any of its disjuncts, then this can be so even if something <i>else</i> makes some of its disjuncts true.<br /><br />The restriction I did not consider, of course, is something along the lines of:<br /><blockquote>(∨– –) If T is a truthmaker for the truth that<i> p</i> or<i> q</i>—<i>and its truth is "entirely due" to the truth that p or to the truth that q</i>—, then either T is a truthmaker for the truth that <i>p</i> or T is a truthmaker for the truth that <i>q</i>.<br /></blockquote> Arguably, some ways of understanding the clause would guarantee the truth of this restriction, but it seems to me it ceases to be capable of sustaining the trivializing argument: that the instance of excluded middle for an arbitrary truth is of this sort would then require motivation.<br /><br />B. In connection with Gonzalo's objection against the contention that if something is a truthmaker for a conjunctive truth then it is a truthmaker for each conjunct, I claimed that in the paper he does not provide reasons to believe that the more embracing thing is a truthmaker when another more discerning truthmaker is available (p. 423), and that the suggestion that the excess does not "contribute" to the truthmaking of the more discerning one by itself merely amounts to a re-description of the fact that the more embracing candidates are precisely more embracing than other available truthmakers (fn. 17).<br /><br />Fruitful discussion with David Liggins, Joan Pagès, and Benjamin Schnieder has convinced me that perhaps some considerations against the conjunction principle, exploring connections of truthmaking with explanation, might be forthcoming. I am still a bit skeptical, but I am open to be persuaded. To my mind, however, the point remains that these have not been provided by Gonzalo's paper I was discussing. Nor, for that matter, by his response now:<br /><br /><blockquote style="border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204); margin: 0pt 0pt 0pt 0.8ex; padding-left: 1ex;" class="gmail_quote">But it is not always the case that the more embracing or inclusive entity involves entities that are irrelevant to the truth of the proposition in question. For instance Calliope, Melpomene, and Thalia contribute and are relevant to the truth of [There are more than two muses]<there>, but the more inclusive group of Calliope, Melpomene, Thalia, and Clio also contribute and are relevant to its truth. Indeed both the group of three muses and the group of four are truthmakers for the proposition <there></there></there>[There are more than two muses]<there><there>. (p. 434)<br /></there></there></blockquote><br />Why not so in the present case at hand? This is in my view the kind of question answering which might provide the required considerations.<there are="" more="" than="" two="" muses=""><there are="" more="" than="" two="" muses=""></there></there>Dan López de Sahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16716694655307652854noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-36597619.post-67937248016465220702008-06-05T05:53:00.005-04:002008-06-06T13:42:33.007-04:00Kaplan-contexts = Lewis-contexts?<span style="" lang="EN-GB">According to Lewis (1980), a <span style="font-weight: bold; font-style: italic;">context </span>is a concrete situation where a sentence could be said, to be identified with a spatio-temporally centered possible world. Lewis seems to interpret Kaplan-context as being things such as his, as opposed to tuples of features of locations (see p. 42 of the reprint). <o:p> </o:p></span> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="" lang="EN-GB">And indeed Kaplan says the following in ‘Afterthoughts:’<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="" lang="EN-GB"></span></p><blockquote><span style="" lang="EN-GB">“... we should say that context <i>provides </i>whatever parameters are needed. [Footnote: This, rather than saying that context <i>is</i> the needed parameter, which seems more natural for the pretheoretical notion of a <i>context of use</i>, in which each parameter has an interpretation as a natural feature of a certain region of the world.]” </span>(p. 591, emphases in the original).</blockquote><p></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="" lang="EN-GB">In so far as I remember, this interpretation seems to be, in any case, at least <i>consistent </i>with the formal system in “Demonstratives” (p. 543). Or am I wrong here?<o:p></o:p></span></p>Dan López de Sahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16716694655307652854noreply@blogger.com5tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-36597619.post-41323100542393332392008-06-05T05:53:00.004-04:002008-06-06T13:41:04.091-04:00Relativizing Utterance-Truth?<span style="" lang="EN-GB"><o:p></o:p>Some time ago, <a href="http://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/people/garciacarpintero/index.htm">Manolo</a> García-Carpintero and <a href="http://www.philosophy.bham.ac.uk/staff/kolbel.shtml">Max</a> Kölbel organized a very fine workshop, which was the origin of <a href="http://www.amazon.co.uk/Relative-Truth-Manuel-Garcia-Carpintero/dp/0199234949">Relative Truth</a>, forthcoming in OUP.<o:p></o:p></span> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="" lang="EN-GB">For some time I’ve been thinking about the title of the workshop, <a href="http://www.ub.es/grc_logos/activities/conferences/relativismabouttruth/index.htm">Relativizing Utterance Truth</a>: some people seem to think that one could characterize a radical relativist position such as MacFarlane’s or Lasersohn’s via the rejection of the absoluteness of utterance-truth. But it seems to me this would fail as a characterization: there are versions of moderate views which reject it as well. I elaborate on this in <a href="http://www.springerlink.com/content/c657441542326388/?p=3c61694c916f43a58c49e928110cd993&pi=2">this note</a>, forthcoming in <i style="">Synthese</i>.<o:p></o:p></span></p>Dan López de Sahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16716694655307652854noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-36597619.post-13662392953108643212008-06-05T05:52:00.001-04:002008-06-06T13:41:30.233-04:00St Andrews<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="" lang="EN-GB">Wow, that was a long long blog-break! Hope this changes a little.<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="" lang="EN-GB">I am still recovering from the Arché tempo for ten days: the <a href="http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/%7Earche/events/event?id=86">Assertion Workshop</a>, the <a href="http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/%7Earche/events/event?id=88">First Contextualism & Relativism Workshop</a>, plus giving one paper to the C&R Seminar and another for the Nostalgia Seminar. The discussions were very very useful for me, I hope I’ll post on them soon.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="" lang="EN-GB">It was just great seeing again friends and meeting the new crowd there!!<o:p></o:p></span></p>Dan López de Sahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16716694655307652854noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-36597619.post-72616163888069574112007-11-14T04:25:00.000-05:002007-11-14T04:46:57.736-05:00Lasersohn (2005) vs Non-Indexical ContextualismI just came back from Paris, where I participated in the <a href="http://www.ugr.es/%7Enef/Perspective/">CPR07</a> organized by <a href="http://www.institutnicod.org/notices.php?user=Recanati">François</a>, <a href="http://www.institutnicod.org/notices.php?user=Stojanovic">Isidora</a>, and <a href="http://www.institutnicod.org/notices.php?user=Villanueva+Fernandez">Neftalí</a>. It has been a great fun, many thanks to them for that! Now I really look forward to submiting something also for the next one <a href="http://paulegre.free.fr/Vagueness/index.html">on vagueness</a>.<br /><br />Isidora presented her '<a href="http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/docs/00/18/48/02/PDF/talkingabouttaste2007.pdf">Talking about Taste</a>,' where she discusses <a href="http://www.springerlink.com/content/p408x76272q23750/">Lasersohn (2005)</a> on the assumption that the view is a version of non-indexical contextualism, and I've met some other people attributing that view to him likewise. But I think this is not correct.<br /><br />Lasersohn does say that the truth of contents is relative to a further, non-standard coordinate in indices, a judge, who <span style="font-style: italic;">will be provided by the context</span>. But he also says:<br /><blockquote><span style="font-size:85%;">In order to maintain an authentically subjective assignment of truth values to sentences containing predicates of personal taste, we must allow that the objective facts of the situation of utterance do not uniquely determine a judge. The formalism developed ... required that for any context <span style="font-style: italic;">c</span>, there must be a unique individual <span style="font-style: italic;">j_c</span>, the judge of <span style="font-style: italic;">c</span>. That is, it was stipulated that the contexts uniquely determine a judge. If we are to retain this feature of the formalism, therefore, we must conclude that <span style="font-style: italic;">the objective facts of the situation of</span><span style="font-style: italic;"> utterance do not uniquely determine a context</span>. (p. 669, emphasis added)</span></blockquote>Hence, contrary to the appearances produced by his non-standard use of 'context,' Lasersohn view is indeed <span style="font-style: italic;">radical</span> relativism proper.Dan López de Sahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16716694655307652854noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-36597619.post-3945853719523690152007-10-25T10:04:00.000-04:002007-10-25T10:05:40.383-04:00Happy Birthday, bleb!!<a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiBUgV7oH3NIMt1CCeVkyRuJCi9pSSNgxdpjTau9dVK2wDP9-L_a-Jmx-E7Ms8tkRXNzxPKlYeJ-oUN3hoa_yeaQNiLjC9fP1uwiF9eZo2B-qpzed_MJKM9npe1z3AJNonVnXtgBA/s1600-h/bleb1year.jpg"><img style="margin: 0px auto 10px; display: block; text-align: center; cursor: pointer;" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiBUgV7oH3NIMt1CCeVkyRuJCi9pSSNgxdpjTau9dVK2wDP9-L_a-Jmx-E7Ms8tkRXNzxPKlYeJ-oUN3hoa_yeaQNiLjC9fP1uwiF9eZo2B-qpzed_MJKM9npe1z3AJNonVnXtgBA/s320/bleb1year.jpg" alt="" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5125275230070507842" border="0" /></a><br />Yep, one year already!<br /><p>I'm back in Barcelona -- I feel I'm still moving, but has been a month now! Hope I manage to get some normality soon!</p>Dan López de Sahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16716694655307652854noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-36597619.post-2759672539377801872007-09-07T12:58:00.000-04:002007-09-07T13:05:59.962-04:00Vagueness at NYU<span style="" lang="EN-GB">Yesterday we had the first session of the NYU Seminar <a href="http://philosophy.fas.nyu.edu/object/philosophy.grad.coursesfl07.html">on Vagueness</a>. Wow. As you’ll imagine, it’s just impressive to get the topic introduced by <a href="http://philosophy.fas.nyu.edu/object/crispinwright">Crispin</a> Wright, and discussed by <a href="http://philosophy.fas.nyu.edu/object/hartryfield">Hartry</a> Field, <a href="http://philosophy.fas.nyu.edu/object/kitfine">Kit</a> Fine, <a href="http://philosophy.fas.nyu.edu/object/stephenschiffer">Stephen</a> Schiffer, and <a href="http://philosophy.fas.nyu.edu/object/tedsider">Ted</a> Sider, among others. Very very impressive.<o:p></o:p></span> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="" lang="EN-GB">I will only attend to the very first sessions, though. In October, I’ll be joining <a href="http://www.icrea.es/">ICREA</a>—from the Catalan for <i>Catalan Institution for Research and Advanced Studies</i>—back in </span><st1:city><st1:place><span style="" lang="EN-GB">Barcelona</span></st1:place></st1:city><span style="" lang="EN-GB"> as a (junior) researcher. I’m both excited for everything I'll get there and sad for everything I’ll miss here… Oh well whatayagonnado?<o:p></o:p></span></p>Dan López de Sahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16716694655307652854noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-36597619.post-5147002290063299532007-08-08T12:15:00.000-04:002007-08-08T12:43:11.059-04:00On the Semantic Indecision of Vague Singular TermsI've just seen that Donald Smith's ‘<a href="http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00040.x">Vague Singulars, Semantic Indecision, and the Metaphysics of Persons</a>’ is out in <span style="font-style: italic;">PPR</span>.<br /><br />Smith argues that if ‘I’ is indeed vague, and the view of vagueness as semantic indecision correct after all, then ‘I’ cannot refer to a composite material object. But his considerations would, if sound, also establish that ‘Tibbles,’ ‘Everest,’ or ‘Toronto,’ do not refer to composite material objects either—nor hence, presumably, to cats, mountains, or cities. And both considerations can be resisted, anyway.<br /><br />As to the first, it suffices to observe that if ‘I’ (or ‘Tibbles’) is vague, and the view of vagueness as semantic indecision is correct, then, when I assert a sentence containing it, I do no need to take myself to having successfully referred to any particular thing—if that is understood as definitely referring to something. Rather, I aim my statement to turn out true on any admissible way of making the semantic decisions that are not (and should not, and maybe could not, be) made.<br /><br />As to the second, one just has to notice that the “many” solution to the problem of the many is certainly not the <span style="font-style: italic;">only </span>solution that defenders of the view of vagueness as semantic indecision can adopt—and have indeed adopted. One rival solution by disqualification is the so-called “supervaluationist” solution, mentioned by Lewis and more recently defended by McGee & McLaughlin, Varzi, and Weatherson. According to this alternative solution, each sharpening of ‘is a cat’ or ‘is a person’ selects just one of the many candidates—different ones in the different sharpenings, thus respecting the arbitrariness felt in denying that they all had an equal claim. ‘Tibbles is a cat’ serves as a penumbral connection, guarantying that it is rendered inadmissible any sharpening that selects a different candidate as the referent of ‘Tibbles’ from the one that is selected as belonging to the extension of ‘is a cat’—inasmuch as ‘If it is not red, then it is orange’ serves to exclude sharpenings in which borderline rose Fifí is assigned both to the extension of ‘is red’ and to that of ‘is orange.’ Thus the many candidates are indeed equally eligible as referents of ‘Tibbles,’ but it definitely the case that one and just one of them is a cat after all. <span style="font-style: italic;">Mutatis mutandis</span>, once again, for persons.<br /><br /><a href="http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/%7Edlds/Smith.pdf">My response</a> will appear shortly in <span style="font-style: italic;">Sorites</span>.Dan López de Sahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16716694655307652854noreply@blogger.com4tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-36597619.post-22316914160777617752007-07-23T14:00:00.000-04:002007-07-23T14:13:41.453-04:00‘Indifferentism’?In connection with the issue about labels <a href="http://blebblog.blogspot.com/2007/07/meta-metaphysical-taxonomy-ovronnaz.html">here</a>, <span style="" lang="EN-GB"> <a href="http://home.etu.unige.ch/%7Eguigong3/">Ghislain</a> Guigon </span>has suggested to me ‘<span style="font-style: italic; font-weight: bold;">indifferentism</span>’:<br /><p></p><blockquote>"it seems to me that it reflects two aspects of your true dismissivism: first there is no difference in truthmakers between the opposite views. Second, the right philosophical attitude is to remain indifferent regarding the dispute."</blockquote>I've just leared that the label <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indifferentism">does already exist</a>:<br /><blockquote>"In Roman Catholicism, <span style="font-style: italic;">indifferentism </span>is a condemned heresy that holds that one religion is as good as another, and that all religions are equally valid paths to salvation. Its condemnation is closely linked to the dogmatic definition that outside the Church there is no salvation."</blockquote>I'm not sure about whether this goes against or in favor of using the label in the metametaphysical discussion (although I'm inclined to say that probably the latter)!Dan López de Sahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16716694655307652854noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-36597619.post-14013357175769945052007-07-20T16:14:00.000-04:002007-07-20T16:15:44.169-04:00Crispin Wright goes to NYU<a href="http://leiterreports.typepad.com/blog/2007/07/wright-from-st-.html">http://leiterreports.typepad.com/blog/2007/07/wright-from-st-.html</a>Dan López de Sahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16716694655307652854noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-36597619.post-37325596425717075802007-07-19T20:48:00.000-04:002007-07-19T20:49:04.131-04:00CFP: LOGOS Conference on Meta-Metaphysics<b><span style="font-family: Verdana; color: black;" lang="EN-GB">LOGOS Conference on Meta-Metaphysics</span></b><span style="font-family: Verdana; color: black;" lang="EN-GB"><br />Barcelona</span><span style="font-family: Verdana; color: black;" lang="EN-GB"> , 19-21 June 2008</span> <p><span style="font-family: Verdana; color: black;" lang="EN-GB"></span><b><span style="font-family: Verdana; color: black;" lang="EN-GB">First Call for Papers</span></b></p> <p><b><span style="font-family: Verdana; color: black;" lang="EN-GB"></span></b><span style="font-family: Verdana; color: black;" lang="EN-GB">Do numbers, sets, and other abstract entities, exist? Does mereological composition ever occur? Does it always occur? How do objects persist through time? In recent years, there has been an increasing interest in the status of certain traditional debates in metaphysics such as these.<b> </b>Some think that some of these turn out to be genuine disputes but of a semantic or conceptual character. Some think that some of these turn out to be pseudo-disputes that should be just dismissed. (Some others think, of course, that the disputes are indeed genuine, but not of a semantic or conceptual character.) Reflection of these issues promises to shed light on the nature of philosophical inquiry in general.</span></p> <p><span style="font-family: Verdana; color: black;" lang="EN-GB"></span><i><span style="font-family: Verdana; color: black;">LOGOS—Grup de Recerca en Lògica, Llenguatge i Cognició</span></i><span style="font-family: Verdana; color: black;"> is organizing a conference on meta-metaphysics. </span><span style="font-family: Verdana; color: black;" lang="EN-GB">Invited and submitted papers will be made available to participants one month before the conference. Participants are expected to read them in advance, as there will be no presentation of them during the conference. Sessions will start with a critical commentary (lasting 20 minutes at most), followed by a response by the author(s) (lasting 10 minutes at most) and a general open discussion period.</span><script><!-- D(["mb","\u003c/p\>\n\n\n\n\u003cp\>\u003cspan style\u003d\"font-family:Verdana;color:black\" lang\u003d\"EN-GB\"\>Proposals to participate as a speaker\nand/or as a commentator should be sent by e-mail to \u003ca href\u003d\"mailto:logos@pcb.ub.es\" target\u003d\"_blank\" onclick\u003d\"return top.js.OpenExtLink(window,event,this)\"\>logos@pcb.ub.es\u003c/a\> by \u003c/span\>\u003cb\>\u003cspan style\u003d\"font-family:Verdana;color:black\" lang\u003d\"EN-GB\"\>1\n April 2008\u003c/span\>\u003c/b\>\u003cspan style\u003d\"font-family:Verdana;color:black\" lang\u003d\"EN-GB\"\>. Full\npapers in suitable form for blind refereeing should be submitted in order to\nparticipate as a speaker, and a short CV is to be supplied as to participate as\na commentator. We expect to notify accepted proposals within four weeks of the\ndeadline.\u003c/span\>\u003c/p\>\n\n\n\n\n\n\u003cp\>\u003cspan style\u003d\"font-family:Verdana;color:black\" lang\u003d\"EN-GB\"\>Participants other than invited speakers\nwill have to rely on their own institutions to defray the cost of travel and\naccommodation.\u003c/span\>\u003cb\>\u003cspan style\u003d\"font-family:Verdana;color:black\" lang\u003d\"EN-GB\"\> \u003c/span\>\u003c/b\>\u003c/p\>\n\n\u003cp\>\u003cb\>\u003cspan style\u003d\"font-family:Verdana;color:black\" lang\u003d\"EN-GB\"\>Confirmed Invited Speakers:\u003c/span\>\u003c/b\>\u003c/p\>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\u003cp\>\u003cspan style\u003d\"font-family:Verdana;color:black\" lang\u003d\"EN-GB\"\>John Hawthorne (\u003c/span\>\u003cspan style\u003d\"font-family:Verdana;color:black\" lang\u003d\"EN-GB\"\>Oxford\u003c/span\>\u003cspan style\u003d\"font-family:Verdana;color:black\" lang\u003d\"EN-GB\"\>\n)\u003cbr\>Amie Thomasson (\u003c/span\>\u003cspan style\u003d\"font-family:Verdana;color:black\" lang\u003d\"EN-GB\"\>Miami\u003c/span\>\u003cspan style\u003d\"font-family:Verdana;color:black\" lang\u003d\"EN-GB\"\>)\u003cbr\>Stephen Yablo (MIT) \u003c/span\>\u003c/p\>\n\n\u003cp\>\u003cb\>\u003cspan style\u003d\"font-family:Verdana;color:black\"\>Organizing\nCommittee:\u003c/span\>\u003c/b\>\u003c/p\>\n\n\n\n\n\n\u003cp\>\u003cspan style\u003d\"font-family:Verdana;color:black\"\>Manuel\nGarcía-Carpintero (Barcelona)\u003cbr\>Dan López de Sa (NYU/St Andrews)\u003cbr\>Pablo Rychter\n(Barcelona)\u003c/span\>\u003c/p\>\n\n\n\n\u003cp\>\u003cspan style\u003d\"font-family:Verdana;color:black\"\>\u003c/span\>\u003cb\>\u003cspan style\u003d\"font-family:Verdana;color:black\" lang\u003d\"EN-GB\"\>Scientific Committee:\u003c/span\>\u003c/b\>\u003c/p\>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\u003cp\>\u003cspan style\u003d\"font-family:Verdana;color:black\" lang\u003d\"FR\"\>Fabrice\nCorreia (Rovira i Virgili)\u003cbr\>",1] ); //--></script></p> <p><span style="font-family: Verdana; color: black;" lang="EN-GB">Proposals to participate as a speaker and/or as a commentator should be sent by e-mail to <a href="mailto:logos@pcb.ub.es" target="_blank" onclick="return top.js.OpenExtLink(window,event,this)">logos@pcb.ub.es</a> by </span><b><span style="font-family: Verdana; color: black;" lang="EN-GB">1 April 2008</span></b><span style="font-family: Verdana; color: black;" lang="EN-GB">. Full papers in suitable form for blind refereeing should be submitted in order to participate as a speaker, and a short CV is to be supplied as to participate as a commentator. We expect to notify accepted proposals within four weeks of the deadline.</span></p> <p><span style="font-family: Verdana; color: black;" lang="EN-GB">Participants other than invited speakers will have to rely on their own institutions to defray the cost of travel and accommodation.</span><b><span style="font-family: Verdana; color: black;" lang="EN-GB"> </span></b></p> <p><b><span style="font-family: Verdana; color: black;" lang="EN-GB">Confirmed Invited Speakers:</span></b></p> <p><span style="font-family: Verdana; color: black;" lang="EN-GB">John Hawthorne (</span><span style="font-family: Verdana; color: black;" lang="EN-GB">Oxford</span><span style="font-family: Verdana; color: black;" lang="EN-GB"> )<br />Amie Thomasson (</span><span style="font-family: Verdana; color: black;" lang="EN-GB">Miami</span><span style="font-family: Verdana; color: black;" lang="EN-GB">)<br />Stephen Yablo (MIT) </span></p> <p><b><span style="font-family: Verdana; color: black;">Organizing Committee:</span></b></p> <p><span style="font-family: Verdana; color: black;">Manuel García-Carpintero (Barcelona)<br />Dan López de Sa (NYU/St Andrews)<br />Pablo Rychter (Barcelona)</span></p> <p><span style="font-family: Verdana; color: black;"></span><b><span style="font-family: Verdana; color: black;" lang="EN-GB">Scientific Committee:</span></b></p> <p><span style="font-family: Verdana; color: black;" lang="FR">Fabrice Correia (Rovira i Virgili)<br /><script><!-- D(["mb","Manuel García-Carpintero\n(Barcelona)\u003cbr\>John\nHawthorne (Oxford)\u003cbr\>Max Kölbel\n(Birmingham)\u003cbr\>Dan López de\nSa (NYU/St Andrews)\u003cbr\>Sven\nRosenkranz (Barcelona/St Andrews)\u003cbr\>Pablo\nRychter (Barcelona)\u003cbr\>Amie\nThomasson (Miami)\u003cbr\>Gabriel Uzquiano (Oxford)\u003cbr\>Timothy Williamson (Oxford)\u003cbr\>Stephen Yablo (MIT)\u003c/span\>\u003c/p\>\n\n\n\n\u003cp\>\u003cb\>\u003cspan style\u003d\"font-family:Verdana;color:black\" lang\u003d\"EN-GB\"\>Further information:\u003c/span\>\u003c/b\>\u003c/p\>\n\n\n\n\u003cp\>\u003cspan style\u003d\"font-family:Verdana;color:black\"\>\u003ca href\u003d\"mailto:logos@pcb.ub.es\" target\u003d\"_blank\" onclick\u003d\"return top.js.OpenExtLink(window,event,this)\"\>\u003cspan lang\u003d\"EN-GB\"\>logos@pcb.ub.es\u003c/span\>\u003c/a\>\u003c/span\>\u003cspan style\u003d\"font-family:Verdana;color:black\"\>\n\u003cbr\>\u003ca href\u003d\"http://www.ub.edu/grc_logos\" target\u003d\"_blank\" onclick\u003d\"return top.js.OpenExtLink(window,event,this)\"\>\u003cspan lang\u003d\"EN-GB\"\>www.ub.edu/grc_logos\u003c/span\>\u003c/a\>\u003c/span\>\u003cb\>\u003cspan style\u003d\"font-family:Verdana;color:black\" lang\u003d\"EN-GB\"\>\u003c/span\>\u003c/b\>\u003c/p\>\n",0] ); //--></script>Manuel García-Carpintero (Barcelona)<br />John Hawthorne (Oxford)<br />Max Kölbel (Birmingham)<br />Dan López de Sa (NYU/St Andrews)<br />Sven Rosenkranz (Barcelona/St Andrews)<br />Pablo Rychter (Barcelona)<br />Amie Thomasson (Miami)<br />Gabriel Uzquiano (Oxford)<br />Timothy Williamson (Oxford)<br />Stephen Yablo (MIT)</span></p> <p><b><span style="font-family: Verdana; color: black;" lang="EN-GB">Further information:</span></b></p> <span style="font-family: Verdana; color: black;"><a href="mailto:logos@pcb.ub.es" target="_blank" onclick="return top.js.OpenExtLink(window,event,this)"><span lang="EN-GB">logos@pcb.ub.es</span></a></span><span style="font-family: Verdana; color: black;"><br /><a href="http://www.ub.edu/grc_logos" target="_blank" onclick="return top.js.OpenExtLink(window,event,this)"><span lang="EN-GB">www.ub.edu/grc_logos</span></a></span>Dan López de Sahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16716694655307652854noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-36597619.post-10544022164594020142007-07-11T12:31:00.000-04:002007-07-11T12:36:44.986-04:00Is the Problem of the Many a Problem in Metaphysics? (Bristol)<span style="" lang="EN-GB">The </span><a href="http://www.bristol.ac.uk/philosophy/department/events/jointsession07/home.html"><span style="" lang="EN-GB">2007 Joint Session</span></a><span style=""> <span lang="EN-GB">in </span></span><st1:city><st1:place><span style="" lang="EN-GB">Bristol</span></st1:place></st1:city><span style="" lang="EN-GB">, organized by <a href="http://www.bristol.ac.uk/philosophy/department/staff/ae.html">Anthony</a> Everett and his team, was also excellent! Besides philosophy, and as expected, it was great seeing lots of friends, and meeting lots of new people: apparently it was the biggest JS ever!<o:p></o:p></span> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="" lang="EN-GB">There I presented my ‘<a href="http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/%7Edlds/POM.pdf">Is the Problem of the Many a Problem in Metaphysics?</a>,’ which I very happily had just learned has been accepted in <a href="http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0029-4624&site=1">Noûs</a>. <span style=""> </span>The discussion didn’t go that well at the time, as I was particularly slow and obtuse, but now I think it was very useful. (The following reconstruction is greatly indebted to posterior discussion with <a href="http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/%7Epmg2/PG%27s%20personal%20web%20page.htm">Patrick</a> Greenough and <a href="http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/%7Ekjh5/">Katherine</a> Hawley.)<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="" lang="EN-GB"><a href="http://www.philosophy.ox.ac.uk/members/twilliamson/index.htm">Tim</a> Williamson objected that there is the danger that many if not all genuine disputes in metaphysics turn out to be “in semantics” in the sense in which I was claiming that the dispute between different solutions to the problem of the many is “in semantic”—assuming the view of vagueness as semantic indecision. One might try to block this overgeneralization concern via appealing to both parties agreeing that the ‘mountain’-free description is complete with respect to all the facts—except for facts about which should <i>also</i> be described as facts involving mountains—, along the lines I suggested in the paper. But then, Tim worried, one would be thereby committed to a coarse-grained notion of <i>fact</i> incapable of expressing controversial issues in philosophy—for under this sense (one of the parties would hold) the fact that mountains are mountains* is identical to the fact that mountains* are mountains* and so on. On reflection, I am now inclined to say that this is indeed right, but something that the defenders of the view should actually endorse. Consider, for an analogy, a Lewisian conception about values according to which it is analytic that something is good iff we are disposed to value it under appropriate conditions. If this is correct, then the fact that something is good would be identical to the fact that we are disposed to value it under appropriate conditions—its philosophical controversiality and non-obviousness notwithstanding.<o:p> </o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="" lang="EN-GB"><a href="http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/%7Ekjh5/">Katherine</a> Hawley pointed out that, as stated, a dispute would qualify as in semantics according to me even if the parties agreed on what things there are and which properties they have—when they are described in a suitably neutral way—but disagree about the relative naturalness of these objects and properties and, <i>as a result</i> <i>of this</i>, disagree about the semantics of certain expressions. I think I agree on the general point, and that a full characterization of the relevant metametaphysical attitude should take this point into consideration. I don’t think this would affect the particular claim about the problem of the many, as the different objects and properties seem to be equally natural according to both parties, but I’d like to think more about this.<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="" lang="EN-GB"><a href="http://www.personal.leeds.ac.uk/%7Ephljrgw/index.htm">Robbie</a> Williams wondered whether the main issues could be more neutrally raised directly in terms of the relevant definiteness-involving statements, leaving the view of vagueness as semantic indecision as one possible way among others of explicating the notion. As I said there, I haven’t explored yet the shape to these issues if the assumption of vagueness as semantic indecision is not in place. <o:p></o:p></span></p>Dan López de Sahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16716694655307652854noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-36597619.post-56334435599421225092007-07-10T18:11:00.000-04:002007-07-10T18:27:30.520-04:00A Meta-Metaphysical Taxonomy (Ovronnaz)<a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj0BhmZwYwjpJ1SDAtbZxUBimoPhtWIDQrW7JFV_jejM5nczoKvONrDeJjNW8JLNXe-_AK4yz_Pa0dYDxAUDvOJROFTedItPYgW84AqCkxn5LfZ5QHzUhD_awqyi8efQkUfy0J-TQ/s1600-h/ovronazz.bmp"><img style="margin: 0pt 0pt 10px 10px; float: right; cursor: pointer;" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj0BhmZwYwjpJ1SDAtbZxUBimoPhtWIDQrW7JFV_jejM5nczoKvONrDeJjNW8JLNXe-_AK4yz_Pa0dYDxAUDvOJROFTedItPYgW84AqCkxn5LfZ5QHzUhD_awqyi8efQkUfy0J-TQ/s320/ovronazz.bmp" alt="" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5085694908590902066" border="0" /></a><br /><span style="" lang="EN-GB">I’ve just come back from </span><st1:place><span style="" lang="EN-GB">Europe</span></st1:place><span style="" lang="EN-GB">. In Ovronnaz, we enjoyed a wonderful <a href="http://www.unifr.ch/philo/ecole-doctorale/metaphysics.html">metaphysics workshop</a>, excellently organized by <a href="http://www.unifr.ch/philo/modern-contemporary/benovsky/index.html">Jiri</a> Benovsky. Very friendly atmosphere, very fruitful discussions of the pre-read papers, and, as you can see in the pic (thanks to <a href="http://home.etu.unige.ch/%7Eguigong3/">Ghislain </a>Guigon), a very very enjoyable venue!</span><span style="" lang="EN-GB"><o:p> </o:p></span> <p class="MsoNormal">In my paper I defended that there are two very different meta-metaphysical attitudes sometimes conflated in the recent literature. On the one hand there is the idea that some apparent disputes in metaphysics are <span style="font-style: italic;">genuine </span>disputes, but <span style="font-style: italic;">in semantics</span>. This I illustrated with the dispute among defenders of the different solutions to the problem of the many, assuming vagueness is semantic indecision. (This was my paper in the JS, I’ll post on it separately later.) I really enjoyed the discussion about this. Among many other things discussed, <a href="http://www.philosophy.leeds.ac.uk/Staff/John-Divers.htm">John</a> Drivers pointed out that some disputes satisfying my sufficient condition might be “less in order” than I suggested—if, for instance, semantics of English leaves indeterminate which of the different semantic claims is correct—; and both Jiri and <a href="http://philosophy.syr.edu/FacHeller.htm">Mark</a> Heller worried whether there are examples where the initial appearance of the dispute being <i>in metaphysics</i> is stronger.</p><span style="" lang="EN-GB"><o:p> </o:p></span> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="" lang="EN-GB">On the other hand, there is the quite distinct idea that some apparent disputes in metaphysics turn out to be <span style="font-style: italic;">merely apparent</span> disputes, given that the views in question are metaphysically equivalent. The workshop itself provided further illustrations, as Jiri was in effect arguing that this is indeed the case between (versions of) the bundle theory vs the substratum theory, and Mark between 3D and 4D theories about persistence.<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="" lang="EN-GB">One thing some of us also discussed was which label would be appropriate for the latter kind of attitude. In the paper I used ‘(true) dismissivism,’ as to distinguish it from <o:p></o:p><a href="http://www.princeton.edu/%7Ekbennett/">Karen</a> Bennett’s <a href="http://www.princeton.edu/%7Ekbennett/CCMaug2006.pdf">usage</a> (see <a href="http://blogblogos.blogspot.com/2006/11/mm-benett-taxonomy-of-dismissivist.html">here</a> why). Another alternative label I found myself using in Mark’s discussion was ‘equivalentism.’ Any views?<o:p></o:p></span></p>Dan López de Sahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16716694655307652854noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-36597619.post-65285115730282410322007-06-29T16:07:00.000-04:002007-06-29T16:10:44.079-04:00Back in EuropeI'm leaving Brooklyn for some days, in order to participate in the <a href="http://www.unifr.ch/philo/ecole-doctorale/metaphysics.html">Metaphysics Workshop in Ovronnaz</a> (Switzerland) and the <a href="http://www.bristol.ac.uk/philosophy/department/events/jointsession07/home.html">2007 Joint Session in Bristol</a> (UK). Looking forward to seeing lots of friends there!Dan López de Sahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16716694655307652854noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-36597619.post-50693513764030994102007-06-28T16:46:00.000-04:002007-06-28T16:50:32.987-04:00Rigidity for Predicates and the Trivialization ProblemI've just learned that this paper has been accepted for publication in <a href="http://www.philosophersimprint.org/">Philosophers' Imprint</a>. Thanks to everyone with whom I dicussed it in the last years!Dan López de Sahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16716694655307652854noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-36597619.post-90257704188580570232007-06-05T04:27:00.000-04:002007-06-05T04:32:28.375-04:00Vagueness in St AndrewsI'm back in St Andrews, for some vagueness-related events: <a href="http://sophos.berkeley.edu/macfarlane/">John</a> MacFarlane's visit, the <a href="http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/~arche/events/event?id=75">2007 Arché Academic Audit</a>, and the <a href="http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/~arche/vagueness/index.html">Vagueness Conference</a>.<br /><br />Oh, I was missing Arché <span style="font-style:italic;">tempo</span>!Dan López de Sahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16716694655307652854noreply@blogger.com5tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-36597619.post-17053060588845996362007-05-15T17:42:00.000-04:002007-06-10T07:37:10.606-04:00The Atheist's Nightmare: The BananaThanks to <a href="https://webspace.utexas.edu/anm526/www/index.htm">Aidan</a>'s <a href="http://aidanmcglynn.blogspot.com/search/label/Argument%20from%20Design">the boundaries of language</a>, I've just been enlightened. Just irrefutable.Dan López de Sahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16716694655307652854noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-36597619.post-55311174230068424452007-05-10T15:35:00.000-04:002007-05-10T15:39:32.438-04:00Worlds and Times Enough or Locations?(X-posted from the <a href="http://archeans.blogspot.com/2006/08/worlds-and-times-enough-or-locations.html">Arché Weblog</a>.)<span style="" lang="EN"> </span><span style="" lang="EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></span> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 6pt; text-align: justify;"><span style="" lang="EN-GB">Some time ago </span><span style="" lang="EN">we discussed <a href="http://www.sitemaker.umich.edu/egana">Andy Egan</a>’s ‘<a href="http://journalsonline.tandf.co.uk/openurl.asp?genre=article&issn=0004-8402&volume=82&issue=1&spage=48">Second-Order Predication and the Metaphysics of Properties</a>’ (<i>AJP</i> 82 (2004), 48</span><span style="" lang="EN-GB">–</span><span style="" lang="EN">67), at the St Andrews </span><span style="" lang="EN-GB"><a href="http://arche-wiki.st-and.ac.uk/%7Eahwiki/bin/view/Dept/MetaphysicsReadingGroup">Metaphysics Reading Group</a> </span><span style="" lang="EN">in a couple of sessions. </span><o:p></o:p></p><span style="" lang="EN-GB"></span> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 6pt; text-align: justify;"><span style="" lang="EN-GB">In the paper, it is argued that properties should be identified with functions from worlds to extensions, as a way of solving the following problem: If properties are sets of (possible) instances, things that exist in more than one world can’t have any of their properties contingently. Properties like <i>being green</i> exists in more than one world, but have some properties contingently: <i>being somebody’s favourite property</i>.<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 12pt 0cm 6pt; text-align: justify;"><span style="" lang="EN-GB">Then, although more tentatively, it is argued that properties should be identified with functions from worlds and times to extensions, as a way of solving the following problem: If properties are functions from worlds to extensions, then things without temporal parts can’t have any of their properties at some but not other times. Properties like <i>being bent</i> don’t have temporal parts, but have some properties at some but not other times: <i>being coinstantiated with being hungry.<o:p></o:p></i></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 6pt; text-align: justify;"><span style="" lang="EN-GB">I think I am generally sympathetic, but I was concerned that the same kind of reasoning would also motivate that properties should be identified with functions from worlds and times <i>and places</i> (or <i>locations</i>, for short) to extensions. After all, (i) “Second-order predication” of properties such as <i>having many instances around</i> seem to pose similar problems to the world-time proposal, by being possibly true at some places but not others; (ii) there seem to be parallel cases of spatially self-locating attitudes; and (iii) the response to Lewis' concern seems similarly effective as to defend the world-time-place proposal from the charge that these are relations rather than properties.<o:p></o:p></span></p> <span style="" lang="EN-GB">Any views?</span>Dan López de Sahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16716694655307652854noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-36597619.post-45849770818777359292007-05-08T12:19:00.000-04:002007-05-08T12:22:08.146-04:00Issues concerning Women in Philosophy in the UK<a href="http://www.shef.ac.uk/philosophy/staff/saul/">Jennifer Saul</a> has just announced that the <a href="http://www.dur.ac.uk/swipuk/">Society for Women in Philosophy UK</a> now has a mailing list. Anyone who is interested in issues concerning women in philosophy in the UK is welcome to join. To do so, go to <<a href="http://lists.shef.ac.uk/sympa/info/swip-uk" target="_blank" onclick="return top.js.OpenExtLink(window,event,this)"> http://lists.shef.ac.uk/sympa<wbr>/info/swip-uk</a>>. If you're not a member of the University of Sheffield, you'll need to get a login and password first, which takes mere seconds. You can do this at the left-hand side of the page.Dan López de Sahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16716694655307652854noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-36597619.post-32494536417660473372007-05-07T11:08:00.000-04:002007-05-07T11:37:45.047-04:00Are Factive Verbs a Myth?<span style="" lang="EN-GB">I’ve just came back from <a href="http://philosophy.rutgers.edu/EVENTS/EPISTEMOLOGY">2007 Rutgers Epistemology Conference</a>. The one that interested me most was <a href="http://www.cassetteradio.com/hazlett/">Allan Hazlett</a>’s ‘<a href="http://www.cassetteradio.com/hazlett/myth.pdf">The Myth of Factive Verbs</a>,’ winner of the 2007 Young Epistemologist Prize and forthcoming in <i>Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.</i> I’m afraid I disagree, however.<o:p></o:p></span> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="" lang="EN-GB">Allan argues against the orthodox view among philosophers that certain two-place predicates—‘knows’, ‘learns’, ‘remembers’, and ‘realizes’, for example—are <i>factive </i>in the sense that an utterance of ‘S knows p’ is true only if p, that an utterance of ‘S learned <i>p</i>’ is true only if <i>p</i>, and so on. He presents two consideration aimed to constitute a <i>prima facie</i> case against orthodoxy, and then discusses and rejects certain arguments in favor of orthodoxy. <o:p> </o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="" lang="EN-GB">I found the two considerations less than fully compelling. The first depends on the contention that “if the orthodox view is true, then we should expect the claim that all known propositions are true to be obvious to anyone who knows the meaning of ‘knows’” (p. 2). But on the face of it, this seems to unduly equate something like ‘<i>analyticity</i>’ with the obvious: the fact that ‘remembers’ or ‘sees’ might not be <i>obviously</i> factive for some competent users is clearly compatible with their being indeed factive all the same. As to the second, and as pointed out by several people in the discussion at </span><st1:place><span style="" lang="EN-GB">Rutgers</span></st1:place><span style="" lang="EN-GB">, it seems to depend on a too narrow conception of the phenomenon of loose talk.<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="" lang="EN-GB">It would be argued, however, that if the typical arguments for orthodoxy fail, this is remarkable regardless of the issue as to whether there is or not an antecedent <i>prima facie</i> case against it. The main one discussed by Allan is quite straightforward:<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 27pt;"><span style="font-size:85%;"><i><span lang="EN-GB">The appearance of contradiction</span></i></span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:10;"><span style="font-size:85%;">. Someone who says ‘I know p, but not-p’ contradicts herself. Therefore, knowledge is factive. Mutatis mutandis for learning, remembering, realizing. (p. 6)</span><o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="" lang="EN-GB">To which he replies:<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 27pt;"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:85%;">‘I know p, but not-p’ is not contradictory, but an utterance of it is </span><span style="font-size:85%;"><st1:city><st1:place><span lang="EN-GB">Moore</span></st1:place></st1:city></span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:85%;"> paradoxical—to know that p is to believe that p, and ‘I believe p, but not-p’ is paradigmatically </span><span style="font-size:85%;"><st1:city><st1:place><span lang="EN-GB">Moore</span></st1:place></st1:city></span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:10;"><span style="font-size:85%;"> paradoxical. (p. 6)</span><o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="" lang="EN-GB">One typical way of arguing that ‘I believe p, but not-p’ is not contradictory, however, concerns the fact that is aproblematically OK when turned into the third person: ‘She believes p, but she’s completely wrong: not-p.’ In the case of ‘know,’ by contrast, it sounds exactly as bad as the original first-person version: ‘She knows p, but she’s completely wrong: not-p.’<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="" lang="EN-GB">Allan anticipates this objection, and says:<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 27pt;"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:10;"><span style="font-size:85%;">In §4 I outline what I think are some correct proposals concerning the pragmatics of the<o:p></o:p> use of ‘knows’—and there I maintain that an utterance of ‘S knows p’ typically implies<o:p></o:p> that p is true. I think this goes some way towards explaining why ‘S knows p, but not-p’<o:p></o:p> often sounds improper. (p.6)</span><o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="" lang="EN-GB">Section §4, however, offers a "Gricean" account of the “implication” which exploits that knowing requires believing and a sufficient quantity of epistemic justification for<o:p></o:p> one’s belief. But even in cases where S clearly satisfies both it would still sound contradictory to assert ‘S knows p, but not-p.’<o:p></o:p></span></p>Dan López de Sahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16716694655307652854noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-36597619.post-52182387688949468232007-05-01T14:09:00.000-04:002007-05-01T14:10:17.941-04:00Schaffer on Furnishing Functions(X-posted from <a href="http://blogblogos.blogspot.com/2007/05/mm-chalmers-schaffer-on-furnishing.html">The bLOGOS</a>.)<br /><br />In a part of ‘<a href="http://consc.net/papers/ontology.pdf">Ontological Anti-Realism</a>’ which <a href="http://blogblogos.blogspot.com/2007/03/mm-chalmers-on-another-metametapyical.html">I didn’t comment on</a> (§§8-11), <a href="http://consc.net/chalmers/">David</a> Chalmers considers an objection against anti-realism based on the idea that the absolute unrestricted quantifier has an objective, determinate semantic value. I don’t want to assess his response to the objection here (see related discussion <a href="http://blogblogos.blogspot.com/2006/12/mm-sider-and-bennett-whether-exist.html">here</a>, and references there).<br /><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="" lang="EN-GB"> In order to analyse existence assertions, however, he tentatively introduces the notion of a <i>furnished world</i>—an ordered pair of a world and a domain—and a <i>furnishing function—</i>a mapping from worlds to domains—(see the end of §8).<u1:p></u1:p> <o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style=""><span style="" lang="EN-GB">In his </span><a href="http://consc.net/papers/schaffer-comments.pdf"><span style="" lang="EN-GB">comments</span></a><span style="" lang="EN-GB"> to the paper, </span><a href="http://people.umass.edu/schaffer/"><span style="" lang="EN-GB">Jonathan</span></a><span style="" lang="EN-GB"> Schaffer objects:<u2:p> <o:p></o:p></u2:p></span></p> <u1:p></u1:p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 36pt;"><span style="font-size: 85%;"><i><u><span style="color: black;" lang="EN-GB">The argument for heavyweight realism about fundamental structure</span></u></i></span><span style="font-size: 85%; color: black;" lang="EN-GB">: Furnishing functions are maps from a world to a domain. But a function is a map from one structure (‘the input’) to another (‘the output’). One cannot have a well-defined function without there being some articulated structure to the input. In particular we must be able to specify <i>the arguments </i>of the function. Any function is either complete or partial. It is either injective or not. It is either surjective or not. None of these classifications would make sense unless the input (‘the world’) already comes with some fundamental articulated structure inbuilt, to feed into the function. … I conclude that the framework that Chalmers <i>actually </i>supplies is at least <i>half-realist</i>, in the sense that it presupposes heavyweight realism about fundamental structure.<u2:p></u2:p> (pp. 2-3)</span><span style="font-size: 10px;" lang="EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></span></p> <u1:p></u1:p> <span style="color: black;" lang="EN-GB"><u2:p></u2:p>I am probably missing something here. For I understood that a furnishing function was a map from the class of worlds to the class of domains, whose arguments were precisely just worlds. Thus I don’t see why there being such mappings requires in any sense any “articulated structure” in the items to which the function is applied. Can anyone help?</span>Dan López de Sahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16716694655307652854noreply@blogger.com4tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-36597619.post-52367693020748727862007-04-26T08:55:00.000-04:002007-05-01T10:57:23.982-04:00'Philosophy' at the Uncyclopedia<a href="http://uncyclopedia.org/wiki/Philosophy">Here</a>. Awesome ;-{)}!<br /><br />(Thanks to <a href="http://teresamarques.home.sapo.pt/">Teresa</a> for the link.)Dan López de Sahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16716694655307652854noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-36597619.post-14676662306649375942007-04-25T15:40:00.000-04:002007-05-20T22:42:50.584-04:00How to Respond to Borderline Cases<span style="" lang="EN-GB">It seems that Hannah and her wife Sarah may disagree as to whether Homer Simpson is funny, without neither of them being at fault. This is an uncontroversial (enough) case of <i>apparent faultless disagreement</i>. Whether such an appearance of faultless disagreement is to be endorsed—or even whether it <i>could</i> be endorsed—is, of course, a matter of controversy. But that such <i>appearances</i> exist is, I take it, a <i>datum</i> for<o:p></o:p> non-relativists and relativist alike.<o:p></o:p></span> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="" lang="EN-GB">Some philosophers seem to think that vagueness should be included: borderline cases provide further cases of apparent faultless disagreement. But this, however, does not seem to be so. Take Jason and his husband Justin, and consider a borderline green towel. Typically, I submit, they would not respond to it by taking a view as to whether the towel is green or not. They would simply lack the judgements that they would naturally express in an ordinary context by asserting ‘The towel is green’ or ‘The towel is nor green’ with its literal meaning: rather, if questioned about it, they would easily converge in something like that ‘it sort of is and sort of isn’t,’ ‘it's greenish,’ etc.—and they would be rational in so doing. But then they would lack the building blocks for the appearance of faultless disagreement clearly present in the other case considered above: the (contrasting) judgements. Hannah and Sarah <i>do</i> typically form polar opinions with respect to issues such as whether Homer Simpson is funny; Jason and Justin typically do <i>not</i> form such verdicts with respect to issues such as whether the towel is green.<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="" lang="EN-GB">So this is in essence why I think that vagueness does not provide further cases of apparent faultless disagreement: with respect to borderline cases, people typically do not respond by taking a view—unlike what is the case in genuine cases of apparent faultless disagreement. I have written <a href="http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/~dlds/Borderline.pdf">a paper</a> trying to provide further considerations in favor of this claim. Comments and objections very welcome!<o:p></o:p></span></p>Dan López de Sahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16716694655307652854noreply@blogger.com2