On 'Content Relativism'

At the II Jean Nicod-LOGOS Workshop I was talking about the phenomenon of audience-sensitivity recently discussed by Egan (2009).

Some (not Egan himself) have suggested that such a phenomenon motivates a form of “assessment-sensitivity” of type B1 in previous post. My first aim in the talk was to illustrate how this is not so. Egan suggested that the phenomenon however may motivate at least a refinement the contention that features of one single context determine the truth-value of the sentence. The second aim of the talk was to explore how this may not be so (basically exploiting the flexibility of Lewisian contexts as particular locations where a sentence could be said.)

What interests me here is how to call the assessment-sensitive position alluded to above. In MacFarlane (2005) he called it ‘expressive relativism.’ More recently, he has adopted ‘content relativism’. Although I followed him in López de Sa (2010) (and indeed the talk in Paris), there seem to be two sources of possible dissatisfaction with the choice.

First, MacFarlane picks it from Egan & Hawthrone & Weatherson (2005), and it is not completely clear to me the view intended there. Actually, in the paper I was discussing Egan seems to use the expression for the non-assessment-sensitive position involving different contents or "propositions" for the different people in the audience, see p. 207.

Second, Cappelen (2008) calls ‘content relativism’ a view according to which the content or “proposition” assigned to a sentence at a context (of utterance) varies between contexts of interpretation, where “a context of interpretation is just what you would think it is: a context from which an utterance is interpreted” (fn. 7). It is not clear to me that the “interpretation” alluded to here is the mechanism involved in the presence of audience-sensitive expression or that involving assessment-sensitivity proper.

So what to do? One alternative would be to stick to the original ‘expressive relativism’, but not even MacFarlane seems to be doing that. Another would be to adopt Weatherson’s ‘indexical relativism.’ This has the virtue of following a systematic naming scheme, but would have the inconvenient that the label has been used to refer to indexical contextualist positions, see for instance Wright (2001).

Any views?

Relativisms & 'Relativism's

I’m Paris, after a very enjoyable II Jean Nicod-LOGOS Workshop. During many of the sessions, I was confirming the impression I got that there seems to be something like an emerging consensus regarding the taxonomy of positions in recent debates about contextualism and relativism.

A: Views according to which there is variation of truth-value, but it is always contextual: sentence s can be true at context c while false at context c*.

B: Views about which some variation of truth-value is not contextual but perspectival: sentence s at context (of use) c can be true when assessed from perspective (or context of assessment) p while false when assessed from perspective p*.

Notice that this main distinction does not involve the notion of the content or “proposition” of a sentence, and is thus available to those sympathetic to Lewis (1980)’s misgivings.

Once such a notion is introduced, however, two further distinctions become available. Among A-views,

A1: Sentence s can be true at context c while false at c* by the content of s at c being different than the content of s at c*;

A2: Sentence s can be true at context c while false at context c* even if the content of s is the same at c and at c* by this content determining a different value with respect to the relevant different features of c and c* (or “circumstances of evaluation” determined by c and c*).

Among B-views, the corresponding:

B1: Sentence s at context c can be true when assessed from p while false when assessed from p* by the content of s at c wrt p being different than the content of s at c wrt p*;

B2: Sentence s at context c can be true when assessed from p while false when assessed from p* even if the content of s at c is the same wrt p and p* by this content determining a different value with respect to the relevant different features of (c and) p and (c and p*) (or “circumstances of evaluation” determined by (c and) p and (c and) p*).

The consensus alluded to concerns the taxons themselves, not the labels to refer to them. I thought it’d be convenient to have a map of the alternatives, if only to facilitate communication ;-). So here are some options:

MacFarlane (2007, inter alia):
A = Contextualism

A1 = Indexical Contextualism
A2 = Non-Indexical Contextualism

B = Relativism

B1 = Content Relativism
B2 = Truth Relativism

Weatherson (2009, inter alia):
A = Contextualism

A1= Indexical Contextualism
A2 = Non-Indexical Contextualism

B = Relativism

B1= Indexical Relativism
B2 = Non-Indexical Relativism

López de Sa (2010, inter alia):
A = Moderate Relativism (=Contextualism)

A1= Indexical Contextualism
A2 = Non-Indexical Contextualism

B = Radical Relativism

B1 = Content (Radical) Relativism
B2 = Truth (Radical) Relativism

At the workshop, other groupings of A1, A2, B1, B2 were mentioned. If I don’t misunderstand them:

Kölbel (2009, inter alia):
A1 = (Indexical) Contextualism
A2 & B2 = Relativism

A2 = Moderate Relativism
B2 = Radical Relativism

(Adopted at the workshop by Marques and Zeman. I attributed it to Ripley, but he actually speaks like Weatherson. As he stressed to me, Weatherson-talk has as a virtue that it allows easy reference to the pairs A1&B1 and A2&B2 as the Indexical views and the Non-Indexical views.)

Remark: The forms of assessment-sensitivity in B1 would not count as Relativism (nor a fortiori Radical Relativism).

Recanati:
A1 = Contextualism
A2 & B1 & B2 = Relativism

A2 = Moderate Relativism
B1 & B2 = Radical Relativism

• B1 = Content Relativism
• B2 = Truth Relativism

Question: Which (natural enough) feature do A2 & B1 & B2 share vs A1?

Anyway, do people know of still other usages of the expressions, at least by people accepting something like the A1, A2, B1, B2 partition?